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t.

TOWARD PURE LEGAL EXISTENCE: BLACKS AND THE
CONSTI TUTION*
By
J. Clay Smith, Jr.**
Although the Constitution was at best imperfect •••
If interpreted justly, in full awareness of today's
conditions, and if applied in a consis~ent fashion,
the Constitution can be converted into a document of
liberation for black America.ll
The Negro was brought to America as a slave in 1619.

Since the day

Blacks landed on the shores at Jamestown, law and custom have significantly
influenced their lives.

The constitutions of the various states of the

Union and the U.S. Constitution have been interpreted in many ways in years
past to limit the progress of Blacks in the American society.

Consti tu-

tiona1 interpretations by the courts and legislative enactments by men and
women of, good will have also advanced the position of Blacks in the American
society.

The question today is:

How is the Constitution of the United

States to be interpreted as relates to the interest of Black Americans?
This is a most compelling question as Americans celebrate the bicentennial
anniversary of the United States Constitution.

* This paper was presented on June 18, 1987, at the Distinguished Lecture
Series of the Schomburg Center for Research in Black CUlture, The New York
Public Labrary, commemorating the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution.
** Dean of the Howard University School of Law. He received the A.B.
degree from Creighton University in 1964; the J.D. degree from Howard
Univiersity School of Law in 1967; the IL.M. and S.J.D. degrees from the
George Washington National Law Center in 1970 and 1977, respectively.
~

F. McKiSSick, 3/5 of a

Man

55 (1969).
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Colonial.America, the American Negro landed at Jamestown in the

Fall of 1619.

During the next three hundred years, the American Negro was

systematically separated fram the white population by both law and custom.
In fact, the law was used as a tool for social engineering to reduce the
~

Negro fran the fuetaphysical classification of human to that of chattel,
f

from an original classification of freedan to the status of slavery.

A.
Toward Pure Legal Existence
The bicentennial of the Oonstitution is an important celebration for
this nation.

Its celebration is for all Americans.

During this celebra-

tion, people fran all regions, age and ethnic groups, and political persuasions, will provide greater insight and historical perspective on the meaning
of the Oonstitution.

The discussions, indeed the debates, that will ensue

regarding its interpretation, will no doubt strengthen our collective judgment, renew our faith in what the Oonstitution represents to the world,
and strengthen our determination to have it live up to its tenets for all
Americans.
Black Americans join the nation in celebrating the bicentennial of
our instrument of rule.

However, this year will cause Black Americans to

speak the truth about the agony, and violence, the human disregard, the
ignorance, and the econanic and htnnan despair resulting fran the exclusion of Blacks from the definition of legal existence.

The fact that

Blacks were excluded fran the definition and the panoply of causal effects
can be easily documented.
While many Americans will dwell on the writings and political activities of Jefferson, Madison, Jay, and leading contemporary constitutional law
scholars, many Black Americans will use this bicentennial year to honor the

-3-

unsung national heroes and heroines, the men and wanen of color who were
deprived of their liberty by the phantom whims of segregated systems whose
doors closed to other than white faces.
Professor y/illiam Robert Ming appropriately reminds us that liThe

J

legal status of Negroes ••• cannot be detennined solely by reference to
the written sources of law [such as the Constitution because] they do not
entirely disclose the real legal status of Negroes."2/

Professor Ming

chides us to remember that the words of the Oonstitution are no more than
v-ords.

Professor Ming asserts that "it is the law in operation which

determines the real legal status of Negroes."~

One can hardly disagree

with Ming's assessment that no discussion of change in the legal status
of Blacks can occur without evaluation of the law in operation.
I wish to assert a belief that urges, if not compels, acceptance
among cansti tutional scholars of America.

It is this:

The deCision by

the Framers to allow slavery after the ratification of the United States
Consti tution was a moral flaw in the (bnsti tution • It was morally wrong,
and further,
To the extent that the uneven and disparate application of
the law has left any notion of the lack of the worth and
human dignity of black people, or has interfered in any way
with their natural right to freely partiCipate in a republic
born on a philosophical base that all men are created equal
under law -- to that extent, black people have been denied a pure
legal existence.

Pure legal existence looks to the future but

studies the present and the past of the law that touches black
2/ Ming, "legal Status," The Integration of the Negro Into American
Society 197 (1951).
~

Id. at 201 (emphasis added).
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those similarly situated, in order to trace, to

ascertain, and to analytically assess the growth of how near
they are to an existence which is free fran racial discrimination.

Pure legal existence, then, is an existence, under law,
"

whic~'is barren of racial discrimination in law and in its appli,
cation; it encompasses being in a society in which the accoutert'

ments of slavery are no more.4/

B.
The Mauri Doctrine
On May 6, 1987, Mr. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered a speech com-

manorating the bicentennial in Mauri, Hawaii.

In this speech, now referred

to as "The Mauri Doctrine," Mr. Justice Marshall reminded the world that
the Cbnstitution, when adopted as our instrument of rule, was defective.
What was the defect?

When adopted, the United States Cbnstitution

contained three provisions regarding Black people.

One provision, Article

4, Section 2c, provided that fugitive slaves were to be returned to their
masters.

The second provision, Article l, Section 2C, concerning Cbngres-

sional representation, stated that in determining Cbngressional representation, three-fifths of the slave population was to be added to the free
lJOpulation.

Sane have argued that the three-fifths rule constitutionally

defined Black people as property, as subordinate to the more exclusive
definition of a person afforded to all others whose skin was white.

The

third provision, Article 1, Section 9, a compromise between the Southern
and Northern interest, sanctioned the African slave trade for twenty years.
As Mr. Justice Thurgood Marshall said:

No doubt it will be said when the unpleasant truth of the
history of slavery in America is mentioned during this
if Smith, Memoriam to Frank D. Reeves, 'lbwards a Houstonian School of
Jurisprudence and the Study of Pure legal Existence, 18 How. L.J. 1, 5 (1973).
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bicentennial year that the Consti tutiOll was a product of
its timet?, and embodied a canpromise which, under other
circumstances would not have been made. But the effects
of the Framers' canpromise have remained for generations.
They arose from the contradiction between guaranteeing
liberty and justice to all, and denying both to Negroes.51
J

As

Americans celebrate the bicentennial of the United States Constitu-

tion and the Sigqlficant acts that took place in Philadelphia two hundred
:
years ago, Mr. Justice Marshall reminds America that it cannot lose sight of
the reality of the conditions which gave rise to the enslavement of Black
human beings.

Americans cannot and must not be allowed to celebrate the

two hundredth birthdate of our instrument of rule, without remembering that
it denied constitutionally ordered liberty to Black people.

If we forget,

and if the nation forgets the effects the denial of liberty caused in the
mdsery, the suffering, and the inhuman brutality on Black people, then, the
national celebration of the two hundredth anniversary of the United States
COnstitution may well be a disingenuous celebration.61
The ink on Mr. Justice Marshall's speech had not dried before it was
criticized as an unfair and narrow portrayal of the Framers of the Oonstitution.

However, as hard as it is for sane Americans to swallow, 71

Mr •

51 Ranarks of Justice Thurgood Marshall, At the Annual Seminar of the San
Francisco Patent and Trademark Law Association In Mauri, Hawaii, May 6, 1987
at 5-6. (Hereafter Mauri Doctrine).

61 Id. at 8. See Marshall, An Evaluation Of Recent Efforts To Achieve Racial
Integration In Fducation Through Resort To The Oourts, 21 J. Negro Ed. 316-327,
335-336 (1952). (Denial in area of education discussed by Thurgood Marshall.)
7I See, e.g., Thurgood Marshall's (bnsti tution, The Detroit News, May 10,
1987, at A22, col. 1; Yoder, That 'Defective' Constitution, Wash. Post, May
14, 1987, at A25, col. 1; Francis, Wisdan Marshall could have used, Wash.
Times, May 15, 1987, at 3D, col. 1; Goldwin, Why Blacks, Wanen and Jews are
not Mentioned in the Constitution, Commentary, May, 1987 at 28; Hodel, In
Defense of Constitution, N.Y. T~es, May 13, 1987, at A20, col. 1; Constitution Defended From Marshall Criticism, Los Angeles Sentinel, May 28, 1987,
at Al6, col. 4; July, Oonsti tution Wasn't About Justice, but Order, N.Y.
T~es, May 31, 1987, at E28, col. 4; Waite, People's Slavery, N.Y. Times,
June 12, 1987 , at A30, col. 4. See also, D. Bell, Race, Racism and American
Law 49-50 (1973) (quoting S. Lynd, Slavery And The Founding Fathers 119-131
(M. Drimner, ed. 1968» for a different view on why the word "slave" was
not used in the COnstitution.

-6Justice Thurgood Marshall is correct in his assertion that the Framers of
the Cbnstitution intentionally excluded Blacks from the reaches of constitutional guarantees, thereby rendering the document flaWed.~/

The views

of Justice Marshatl are ~portant to any national debate on the original
1
intent of the Cbristi tution. As the first and only Black American to s1 t on
the United States SUpreme Court his views should cause Americans to face
the fact that our Constitution, for wbatever reason, made slavery a legally
permissible status.
How could Justice Marshall, trained at Howard Universi ty School of law, 9/
allow this year to pass without reminding the nation of the truth? If Justice
Marshall had remained Silent, if he had allowed the apologists to bury the
truth, he would have betrayed the teachings of his mentor Dr. Charles Hamil ton
Houston, 10/ the efforts of his life's work and tha t of other Black lawyers, and

~

See, e.g., Mauro, Burger on Constitution: 'It isn't perfect.' USA Today,
at 1, col. 2; Justice Marshall's Critique, Wash. Post, May 9, 1987, at A22,
col. 1; Gilliam, Constitutional Outrage, Wash. Post, May 18, 1987, at C3,
col. 5; Payne, A Flawed Constitution, Wash. Afro-American, May 19, 1987,
at 5, col. 1; Molotsky, Slavery Issue Adds Vigor to Debate, N•Y. Times,
May 21, 1987, at A22, col. 4; Jacob, Celebrating the Bicentennial, Wash.
Afro-American, May 26, 1987, at 4, col. 1; Cohen, The Q)nstltution Through
Marshall • s Eyes, Wash. Post, May 12, 1987 , at Al9, col. 1; Fleming, The
Constitution, Wash. Afro-American, May 30, 1987 , at 5 col. 1; Kamen, Marshall
Blasts Celebration of Constitution Bicentennial, Wash. Post, May 7, 1987,
at 1, col. 1; Observing the Constitution, Wash. Afro-American, June 2, 1987,
at 4, col. 1 ; Keith, The Celebration of a Living Ibcument, The Detroit News,
June 2, 1987, at 8A, col. 1.

W

Thurgood Mlxshall was graduated from Howard University School of Law
in 1933.

lQJ See G. R. McNeil, Groundwork: Charles Hamil ton Houston and the Struggle
for Civil Rights 77-79 (1983); reviewed by Smith, Forgotten Hero, 98
Han. L. Rev. 482, 487, n. 27 (1984); R. IO.uger, Simple Justice 131 (1976).
See also, J. M. Langston, II The Intellectual, Moral, and Spiritual Chndi tion
of the Slave," Autographs Of Freedan 147 (J. Griffith, ed., 1854). (Marshall's
prinCiples draw on those of John Mercer Langston, who, in 1854 stated, "The
American slave is a htnnan being. II In 1868, langston became the first dean of
Howard University School of Law.)
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laymen alike, who contributed so significantly to cure an inchoate document.ll/
C.

Constitutional Fear and Bifurcation of Blacks
The

Frwner~

.
l;'

of the Constitution attempted the

i

~possible:

.

attempted to dehy the human eX1stence of Black people.

they

However, the exis-

tence of the slave could not be denied, even though he could assert no rights
under his status as property.

The Framers of the (bnsti tution bifurcated

the slave and granted a limited existence for the commercial and political
benefit of persons other than

Legal existence being denied, Black

h~self.

people were rendered powerless to defend their person, their property or to
stake out a

cla~

in a nation that considered them legally invisible.

D.
Reversion to Originally Free Status Created Fear
It was the original intent of the Framers of the Constitution that
slavery would end in 1808.

However, once slavery was legalized in the

nation it was not to be easily dislodged -- not even on moral grounds.
If one were white, rights to life, liberty and property in the State
were claimed to be naturally endowed by God.
Black, rights were not natural.
originally free.l2/

However, if one were

Black people were not considered

If slaves were to revert to their

l!/ See Hastie, The Proposition of the Negro in the American Social Order, 8
J. Negro Ed. 595 (1939); A. L. Higginbotham, Jr., In the Matter of Color
(1978) ; P. Finkelman, Slavery In The Courtroan 3-15 (1985).
12/ See e.g. The Jewish Record, January 23, 1863, quoted in B.W. KOrn,
American Jewry and the Civil War 27 (1951) (contending that Blacks were not
originally free); But see M. Willis, "The Bible Versus Slavery," Autographs
of Freedom 151 (J. Griffiths, ed., 1854); J. H. Oone, A Black Theology of
Liberation, 90-94 (1986) (Cone writes, "The being of the human person as freedan
is expressed in the Bible in tenns of the image of God."); Nelson, The Impact
of the Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth
Century America 87 Harv. L. Rev. 513, 525-536 (1974) (arguing that the moral
and political elements of antislavery thought merged into a single antislavery
Jurisprudence) •
J

J

-8originally free status, a belief always held by Blacks, this would have
vested them with the srune rights and privileges as whites.
such reversionary rights created fears against Blacks.
Blacks posed

The thought of

Sane believed that

to the State and such discourse was used to prolong
0:
J
the institution df slavery.
dang~rs

According to some documentation in Albert J. Beveridge t s Life of John
Marshall, Marshall himself might have believed that Blacks threatened the
State.

In a letter Marshall wrote to Reverend R. R. Gurley in 1831, he said,
The removal of our colored population is, I think, a
camnon object, by no means confined to the slave states
although they are more immediately interested in it.

The

whole Union would be strengthened by it, and relieved
from a danger whose extent can hardly be estimated.l~1
One author has asked: " What was this terrible danger which •••
threatened the cOl.Ultry through the colored population?"l41

She concludes

"that amalgamation was one probable fear, and the other •••

was social

canmingling."l51

Hence, white people feared integration of Blacks into

American life as a matter of social, political and economic principle
which provided the legal basis for the classification of Blacks as legally
impotent.
The expansion of social status of many in the South was predicated on

131

A.J. Beveridge, Life of John Marshall, Vol. IV, at 475 (1919), quoted
II The Negro and The Supreme Court To 1900, n
Misters
Thesis, Howard Universi ty, 1936 , at 36 (hereafter Acldss). Ms. Ackiss was
graduated from The Howard University School of Law in 1931.

by Thelma D. Ackiss,

141

Id. at 36.

151

Ibid.
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the possessory interest, protected by law, of Black people.

As J.

E. Caines

wrote, 16/
[S]lavery in the South is something more than a moral and

poli~cal
principle; it has become a fashionable taste, a
f
social passion.

The possession of a slave in the South carries

with it the same sort of prestige as the possession of land in
this country, as the possession of a horse among Arabs; it
brings the owner into connection with the privileged class and
forms a presumption that he has attained a certain social position.
It is my belief that it was this very presumption that worked its way
into the framing of the Constitution in the bifurcation of slaves as
,

property and as persons for reasons unrelated to their legal existence. This
was an act that defied reason and nullified the very words of the Declaration of Independence:

"We hold these Truths that all Men are created

equal ••• " 17/

16/ J. E. caines, The Slave Power 90 (1862) (quoted by Ackiss, supra note 13,
at 37). Some Blacks were freed by their masters or otherwise gained their
freedom before the Elnancipation Proclamation in 1863. However, the operation
of the law and custom did not advance their status or the fullness of their
legal existence. See Free Blacks In America, 1800-1860, at 24, (B.M. Rudwick,
ed., 1970). See also, C.G.Woodson, A Century of Negro Migration 37-38 (1918)
(statistics of the free colored population of the United States 1850 and 1860).
Id. at 39-60 (regarding the passage of Black Codes in the North to limit the
legal existence of free Blacks.)
17/ D. Bell, Race, Racism and American Law 45-47 (1973). M. F. Berry, Black
Resistance to White Law 7-18 (1971), reviewed by Higginbotham, Race, Racisn and
American Law, 122 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1044 (1974).

-10E.
Legal Existence Slowed Under Early Supreme Court Developments
There crume a ttme that states such as Virginia and Kentucky drew up
resolutions drafted by Jefferson and Madison in 1798, to
1

authority to ex.trcise its powers.
t

1~it

Cbngress'

It was believed that such resolutions

t

were designed

to

protect the institution of slavery.

Even Cllief Justice

John Marshall himself is thought to have shared the beliefs that the
authori ty of the federal government should be limited.

However, Chief

Justice Marshall "soon brought the country around to the pasi tion of thinking that although the federal government is one of enumerated powers, that
govermnent and not that of the states is the judge of the extent of its
powers and, 'though limited in its powers, is suprane' within its sphere
of action."lSI Justice Marshall in redemptive fashion went on to write
that "there is no phrase in the instrument ••• which excludes incidental
or implied p:>wers; and which requires that everything granted shall be
expressly and minutely described."191
Marshall's decisions are important to the crusade of Black Americans
because, though not imnediate, his view that the Constitution was the
Supreme Law of the Land, and not subordinate

to

dictates of the States 201

would sanction legislative acts passed to secure and to protect the civil
rights of Black Americans.211

181 C.

G. Woodson, Fifty Years of Negro Citizenship As Qualified By The United
States SUpreme G:>urt, 6 J. of Negro History 1, 2 (1921) (quoting McCulloch v.
Maryland 17 U.S. (4 \Vheat.) 316, 404, (lS19). The page referred to by Woodson
(416) is an error.

191

Id. at 2, at 404.

201 Cooper v. Aaron, 35S U.S. 1,4, lS-19 (195S).
211 See e.g., United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960); United States v.
Thomas, 362 U.S. 58 (1960); United States v. Alabama, 362 U.S. 602 (1960).

-11It was not "until after John Marshall of Virginia became Chief Justice,
are to be found cases involving Negro rights." 22/ A careful review of the
cases involving Blacks during the period that Chief Justice Marshall was
on the U. s.

Supr~e

Court did not disclose a chronology of cases which gave

j

meaning to the Idgal existence of Black people.

The death of Justice

Marshall in 1835 would usher in Joseph Story as Olief Justice and, to some
extent the abandonment of

~~shallts

view of a strong central government.

The nation drifted towards the supremacy of local governments and Black
people drifted toward an extended period of legal non-existence.231
In 1836, Roger Taney was confinned as Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court.

He served in that capacity until his death in 1864.

While Taney may be credited with developing certain aspects of American
jurisprudence, scholars who support his work, his opinion, and that of the
majori ty of the Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford ,241 did little to advance
the legal existence of Black people.
In the
Ored Scott decision, Chief Judge Taney posed a question touch,
ing the metaphysical intent of the Framers of the Constitution.

It was

this: "Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into the country, and
sold as slaves, becane a member of the political conmuni ty fonned and
brought into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as
such became entitled to all the rights and privileges, and

~unities

guaranteed by that instrument to the citizen?" 25/ The answer to the quesAckiss, supra note 13, at 1-106.
detail in this excellent thesis.)

221

23/

(These cases are discussed in some

e.G. Woodson, supra note 18, at 10.

241 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 1857.
251 Id. at 403.

-12tion posed was "Kb. II

The answer to this question by the court is ample

evidence that Black people were viewed as non-beings as a matter of jurisprudential thought.

To be a person under the Constitution, one had to be

a citizen; to bi a citizen, one had to be a person.

,"

.

Since both the words

ci tizen and person were described by Mr. Justice Taney to be "synonanous
tenns,II261

Black people did not fall within the legal definition of consti-

tutional metaphysics.

Then, what rights, duties or obligations were granted

to the creatures of the African race under the moral
the Chnsti tution?

~peratives

stated in

The answer from the pen of Mr. Chief Justice Taney would

forever cast a cloud over the most revered branch of our nation's government.
Even as Taney tried to further debase Blacks, he could not write about them
without admitting that Blacks were "regarded as beings [although] of an
inferior order ••• "271

Taney sealed the fate of Blacks under the Cbnstitution

wi th words that rang out across the land.

His words were as follows:

[Blacks] had for more than a century before been regarded
as beings of an inferior order, and although unfit to asso-

ciate with the white race either in social or political relations; and so far inferior that they had no rights which
the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro
might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his
benefit.2S1

261

Id. at 404.

2:l l I d . at 407.

2131 Ibid.
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F.
Legal Existence Granted Blacks
On January 1, 1863, President Abraham Lincoln anancipated the slaves
1

by Proclamation. } However, according to Cbnstance Baker M:>tley, this Proclat

t

mation was "a nullity."291 In 1963, she wrote that the Proclamation "was
intended to free only those slaves in states or parts of states which, on
January 1, 1863, were still in rebellion against the United States."301
Slavery in non-rebellious states retained its previous legal status causing
the need for a Constitutional Amendment.
In 1865, the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified and made part of the
Constitution.

The Thirteenth Amendment, the first "Negro Amendment", breath-

ed legal life into a newly freed Black American.

vitude a federal

It made involuntary ser-

cr~e.

On July 28, 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment granted the status of citizenShip to Blacks and cured the metaphysical flaw that denied legal existence

and federal protection to Blacks in the states in which they resided.
Passage of the Fourteenth Amendment has been described as lithe Negro's
charter of liberty." 311

However, it and the other Negro Amendments were

more than a charter of liberty.

The Negro Amendments provided grants of

legal existence heretofore denied to Blacks by the Framers of the Constitution.

These Amendments would gradually move macks towards pure legal

existence in our constitutional democracy.

291

Motley, The Chnsti tution -- Key to Freedom, 28 Ebony 221 (Sept. 1963).

301

Ibid.

311 B. H. Nelson, "The Fourteenth Amendment And The Negro Since 1920," Ph.D.
Dissertation, Catholic University, at 1 (1946). See also, J.A. Cobb, liThe
Consti tutional Rights of the Negro or Race Distinctions in American law, 11 in
F. Styles, Negroes and the Law 63-87 (1937).

-14-

The grant of legal being to Black people was an act that would not immediately end the legitimacy of slavery in the minds of whites in many
southern states.
was not
Whi tes

requir~~

For, after all, it remained their view that the white man
to treat Blacks as equals or to protect them as such.

1

feared Blacks -- as Chief Justice Marshall had written.

the exercise of the very political freedoms
formed and the (bnsti tution was written.
exercise of the franchise.

cla~ed

They feared

when the nation was

This was especially true in the

For example, on December 16, 1868, the Houston

Telegraph gave the following advice to Negro freedmen in Texas:
You are aware that a very large majority of the white
people of Texas are opposed to allowing all of you to
vote, because they do not think you are qualified to
exercise this high privilege.

If the Convention should

confer suffrage upon you it will be the very cause of its
being taken away fran you after awhile, and we believe
that it would deprive you of it forever.32/
Shortly thereafter, one C.W. Bryant, a Black member of the Texas Legislature, responded thusly,
Now Sir, I ask one thing:

Why is it that the white

people are crying daily, 'Let us vote?'
If a free man can live so well in a free country without
a voice in the Govermnent, why not try it yourself for
awhile?

32/ J. Mason Brewer, Negro Legislators of Texas 23-24 (1935).

-15,.
No

Sir; give us the ballot and give it to us for all

time, and then if you can outrun us in the race of life,
all is well.33/
By 1905 the Black
voter in Texas was disfranchised. Again the fear
it
1
that Blacks would: rise up and claim their original legal existence caused
political alarm.

As one author described the disfranchisement of Blacks

in Texas:
As the Negro became more infonned and better educated, and

more accustomed to contending for his rights and getting
some of them, and as he became more conscious of his power
wi th the ballot, the white Texan became more and more alanned

and disturbed over the Negro vote, and its power in the hands
of the colored man.34/
In 1869, one of the most significant tmportant decisions of the
Post-Reconstruction period was decided by the Supreme Court of Georgia,
White v. Clements.35/

The bare facts are these: a black man was elected

Clerk of the Court in Olatham County, Georgia, in 1868.
contender.

He beat a white

The "real vital question at issue" was whether a "person of

color [was competent under the law] to hold office in [Georgia] •••• " 36/
The trial court had ruled for the white plaintiff holding that a Black
person was not competent under law to hold public office.

33/ Ibid. H.L. Moon, Balance of Power: The Negro Vote 215 (1948);
Kousser, "The Undennining of the first Reconstruction," Minority Vote
Dilution 27-46 (D. Chandler, ed., 1984).

34/

Id. at 113.

35/

39 Ga. 232 (1869).

36/ Id. at 241.

-16..

In one of the most unusual cases in the South during this period, the
Georgia Supreme Court, speaking through Justice McCay, held for the Black
incumbent.

Why do I draw attention to this decision?

First of all, White v.

Clements laid theJfoundation for the right of Black Americans to hold public

J

office in the Sta~e of Georgia.

Secondly, the decision casts light on the

state of mind, perhaps even the minds of the drafters of the Federal Constitution, that Black people, though persons, had no legal existence, and that
the distinction between white and Black rights was derived from D1vine Right.
In short, God did not grant to persons of color any legal status; therefore,
white people owed Blacks only such rights as were specifically granted to
them by the legislature.
opinion.

This notion was explained in Justice McCay's

There Justice MCcay says,
••• it is still that the case of the Negro stand upon

a different footing, and that however it may be true, that
the rights of a white American citizen came from God, yet
a black American citizen cannot

cla~

this presumption;

that the rights of the Negro have a different derivation,
they, came from the State, and they can have none, except
such as he can show chapter and verse for.371
Justice McCay, while rejecting this viewpoint, considered the historical argument raised by the white plaintiff attempting to disqualify
the Black incumbent who beat ~ in the election.

371

Id. at 247.

381

Ibid.

Justice Mccay wrote:3S1

-17The Negro, they say, was, as all admit, a slave, without
any rights, save as were specially pointed out by law, and
that having none, became free by special grant, he does
not

sta~d
}.

like a white man, with every right, that is not

i
expresSly denied, but with only such as are specially granted.
Mccay continued ,391
••• in this State [so it was argued] we are to have two
classes of citizens, one holding their rights by divine
gift from the God of nature, in favor of whom there always
exists the presumption that any particular right contended
for, whether it be legal or political, and in reference to

whom, the burden of proof is always against the party denying the right; and another class, whose rights cane not

from God, but fran society, and who in every contest respecting a right, must be able to show by special enactment, that

the right has been granted.
Ironically, even though Justice Mccay rej ected the Divine Right of
people based on race, he held that the Reconstruction statutes by the
national government "recognized [the black incumbent] as a part of the
sovereign people of the State ••• [and therefore Blacks were] entitled to
the same presumption as are other fellow citizens ••• "4QI His decision is
bottaned, not only on the practical liberty of man, but on the statutory
recognition or grant of the equality of Blacks by authority derived fram
the national COnstitution.

391

Ibid.

401

Id. at 255 (original emphasis).

-18Hence, thirty-eight years after Chief Justice Marshall raised the fear
of the liberation of black people in America, a Justice of the Georgia
Suprane Court, interpreting that same Constitution, held that to fear the freedan of Black peoJe was to reject the peace and good order of the State.4l/
r
--

G.
Attainment of Color-Blind Society via Legal Wars
Despite the refusal of the United States Supreme Q>urt to grant social
equality to Blacks in Plessy v. Ferguson,42/ the decision did produce a
dissent by Mr. Justice Harlan that would prospectively cause Americans to
wonder whether the Oonstitution was color-blind.43/
The history of the legal wars fought by Blacks and whites to secure
a SOCial, economic and political color-blind society in America are well

known.

These wars waged on several legal fronts concerned the existence

of Black people.

While there is no longer doubt that Blacks are both

.'

"citizens and persons" within the public legal definition of those teImS,
same constitutional scholars have refused to accept, actively tried to
contain, or to rewrite the definition using the srune arguments that

41/

Id. at 269.

42/ 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
43/

Id. at 556.

-19perfected it.44/
Much of the resistence

to

change was due

accept the fact that Blacks were human.

to

the refusal of whites to

Same clung to the notion of Divine

Right, which gave }~i tes absolute p:>wer over Blacks as their subj ects.
i

Others were afraitl that Blacks would cane to know, understand and collectively assert the very constitutional rights so long denied them, and
ul tima tely lead to a restructuring of the whole society.

Many feared this

possibility.
TO the credit of America, the institution of slavery was outlawed.
However, race remained the badge of slavery which, for most Blacks, could
not be hidden.

Slavery and what it meant to white men remained in the

minds of Blacks and compelled them to systematically turn to the Courts
to

seek a pure legal existence.
Politically, Blacks have had

to

seek judicial relief to thwart the

efforts of those who sought to deny them the right to vote,45/ the right
to serve on juries,46/
~

-

and the dignity of even sitting in the courtrooms

of this nation.47/ The effects of slavery kept Black children from obtain-

44/ See Sni th, EdWin Meese on the Suprane Court, Wash. Post, Oct. 31, 1986,
at A26, col. 4; Taylor, Meese and the Supreme Court: He Deals with Critics
by Softening His Ranarks, N. Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1986, at Al6, col. 1;
Glasser, Cooper v. Aaron [358 U. S. 1 (1958)]: Wbat Did M3ese Mean? Wash.
Post, Nov. 24, 1986, at Al4, col. 5; Kurtz, Meese's View on Court Rulings
Assailed, Defended, Wash. Post, Oct. 2A, 1986, at Al2, col. 1; Meese, The lawman,
Calls for Anarchy, N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1986, at E23, col. 1; Meese, The Tulane
Speech : What I Meant, Wash. Post, Nov. 13, 1986 , at A21, col. 4; Mr. Meese
Replies, Wash. Post, Nov. 14, 1986, at A26, col. 1; Abrams, So Much for Meese's
'Original Intention,' N.Y. T~es, June 4, 1987, at A27, col. 1.
45/ Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
46/

Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).

47/ Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963).

·.
-20ing a competitive education in the South,481

and relegated them to inferior

educations in other sections of the nation.491

Race restricted Blacks

from gaining an education in public, graduate, and professional schools,501
to purchase ham~s in white communities,5l1 and exposed them to prosecution
j

for marrying anon-Black person.52/

The effects of slavery have caused

labor unions to refuse to represent Blacks in labor disputes,531 and cities
to refuse Blacks the use of public recreational facilities,54 I even libraries.551
If one should doubt that there existed a national effort to limit the
legal existence of Blacks, one need only refer to the exhaustive compilation
of States' Laws on Race and Color by Dr. Pauli Murray for support of this
assertion.561

This denial to Blacks of full participation in the moral,

poli tical, social, and economic offering argued for years as derived from
the text of the Constitution is regrettable, in light of the extent to which

481 H. A. Bullock, A History of Negro Education in the South (1967);

J .G. Van

Deusen, The Black Man in White America 159-177 (1938).
,

491

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

501

Missouri ex reI. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).

511 Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See also, Weaver, Race Restrictive
Housing Covenants, 20 J. Land and Public Utility Economics 183 (1944).
521

Loving v. Virgnia, 338 U.S. 1 (1967).

53 I

Steel v. Louisville &. Nashville Railroad, 323 U. S. 192 (1944).

541 Lcmbard v. Louisiana, 373 U. s. 267 (1963).
551 Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U. S. 131 (1966).

561 P. Murray, States Laws on Race and Color (1950); P. Murray, Song in a
weary Throat 284-290 (1987) (describes how states laws on race and color came
about. ) See also, P. Murray, It Consti tutional law and Black Wanen," American
Law and the Black Ccmnuni ty Viewed by Black Women Lawyer, Afro-American
Studies Program, Boston Universi ty, Occasional Paper No.1, at 33 (1973).
Snith, Black Bar Associations and Civil Rights, 15 Creighton L. Rev. 651,
667 (1982).

,

.
-21Blacks have defended this nation on the battlefields of the world.57/

H.
~
~t

,

Toward the

Twe~ty-First

Century

1

The bicentennial of the United States Constitution is here.

All

Americans can and should reflect upon the values embodied in this instrument of rule.

The Constitution deserves the support of American citizens.

The bicentennial will present an excellent opportunity for Black Americans
to review the pages of constitutional history that has denied them the
right of full citizenship in their country, as well as those pages of
constitutional history that they have written, corrected and re-written.
The question facing Blacks in Cblonial America remains unanswered today:
What direction will the interpretation of the United States Constitution
take in order to obtain, secure and protect the rights of Black Americans?
As

we focus our Sights on the Twenty-First Century, hopefully, this

nation~will

forever revere and never retreat from the intrinsic worth,

embodied in the principle that all persons are created equal, and the principle that all of humankind is originally and legally free.

57/ Houston, Critical Summary: The Negro In the U.S. AImed Forces In World
Wars I and II, 12 J. Negro Ed. 364 (1943); Hastie, Negro Officers In Two
World Wars, 12 J. Negro Ed. 316 (1943); K. Miller, History of the World War for
HtUDaIl Rights, 439 (1919). I. H. lee, Negro Medal of Honor Men 139-142 (1969).

